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ABSTRACT
Our research has developed a Parity-based Data Outsourcing (PDO) model. This model
outsources a set of raw data by associating it with a set of parity data and then distributing
both sets of data among a number of cloud servers that are managed independently by differ-
ent service providers. Users query the servers for the data of their interest and are allowed to
perform both authentication and correction. The former refers to the capability of verifying
if the query result they receive is correct (i.e., all data items that satisfy the query condition
are received, and every data item received is original from the data owner), whereas the latter,
the capability of correcting the corrupted data, if any. Existing techniques all rely on com-
plex cryptographic techniques and require the cloud server to build verification objects. In
particular, they support only query authentication, but not error correction. In contrast, our
approach enables users to perform both query authentication and error correction, and does so
without having to install any additional software on a cloud server, which makes it possible to
take advantage of the many cloud data management services available on the market today.
This thesis makes the following contributions. 1) We extend the PDO model, which was o-
riginally designed for one-dimensional data, to handle multi-dimensional data. 2) We implement
the PDO model, including parity coding, data encoding, data retrieval, query authentication
and correction. 3) We evaluate the performance of the PDO model. We compare it with
Merkle Hash Tree (MH-tree) and Signature Chain, two existing techniques that support query
authentication, in terms of storage, communication, and computation overhead.
1CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
The last decade has seen the rising of cloud computing and storage services. With a small
cost or even free, data owners can simply upload their databases to a cloud and let it manage the
data and process queries on their behalf. By releasing data owners from day-to-day management
of software and hardware, cloud services have the potential to save them significant operation
cost. Data owners, however, are facing with difficulty in fully trusting cloud services. After all,
the data is in the hand of a third party that is beyond their own administrative domain. A
cloud may be compromised by outside hackers or corrupted by malicious insiders, thus sending
users wrong answers, unintentionally or intentionally.
The above problem has led to a large body of research (e.g., [9], [21], [7], [8], [32], [33], [31])
on query authentication, i.e., enabling users to verify if the query results they receive are indeed
correct. In the proposed techniques, data owners build an authentication data structure such
as Merkle Hash tree or signature chain on a database and upload both to a server. When a
user queries the database, the server returns not only the query result, but also a hard-to-forge
verification object as a proof that the result includes all data items in the original database
that satisfy the query condition. Existing research, however, has two major limitations:
• It considers only query authentication, but not query correction. Users can only detect if
a query result is wrong. There is no mechanism for users receiving a wrong query result
to find the correct answer.
• Existing solutions all rely on complex cryptographic techniques and therefore incur high
cost in storage, communication and computation. The authentication data structure
built for a set of data items can be many times larger than the data itself. A data item
can be just a 32-bit integer, yet its one-way hash value needs at least 128 bits to ensure
2minimum conflict. The number of bits for a digital signature is even more, usually at least
512. This cost is excessive for small records. The authentication data associated with
a query result can also greatly increase the communication cost. Furthermore, there is
hefty computation such as decryption incurred during the authentication process. These
undesired effects are inherent from cryptographic techniques and especially concerned to
the users of battery-powered mobile devices.
• Existing approaches require the server to run the code that builds and returns verification
objects. Such code is not a standard component of a typical database management system
(DBMS) and can be a security concern to a service provider when installed by a data
owner. Companies such as Heroku Postgres [1] and Openshift [2] provide an instance of
DBMS to their customers, who upload data there and use standard SQL commands for
data manipulation. In such Database as a Service (DaaS) business model, the customers
can upload only data, but not install their own code for query authentication.
To address the above problems, we propose a novel Parity-based Data Outsourcing (P-
DO) [29]. This scheme associates the raw data with parity data and stores them on a set of
servers that are from different service providers. Specifically, the data owner encodes a set of
raw data D into a number of blocks. Each block has k+p data, (x1, x2, · · · , xk, yk+1, · · · , yk+p),
where xi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) is a raw data in D and yk+j (1 ≤ j ≤ p) is a parity data generated for
the k raw data. The p parity data are generated to enable error detection and correction.
That is, all k + p data in the block can be recovered as long as no more than e of them are
missing or wrong, where e is determined by p. The data in the blocks are then outsourced
to a set of n = k + p servers, where the ith data in each block is stored on the ith server.
To retrieve the data of interest, a user queries all servers. By allowing the user to receive at
least k + p − e correct data in each of the blocks that contain some data satisfying the query
condition, PDO makes possible for users to perform query authentication and correction, and
achieves so without using encryption or installing any additional software on a server.
Built on top of our work [29], this thesis makes the following contributions:
• We extend the PDO model, which was originally designed for one-dimensional data, to
3handle multi-dimensional data.
• We implement the PDO model, including parity coding, data encoding, data retrieval,
query authentication and correction.
• We evaluate the performance of the PDO model. We compare it with Merkle Hash Tree
(MH-tree) and Signature Chain, two existing techniques that support query authentica-
tion, in terms of storage, communication, and computation overhead.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. We discuss more related work in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we introduce our PDO model. We first discuss how to support one-dimensional
data, and then extend for multi-dimensional data. We present our implementation in Chapter
4, and evaluation its performance in Chapter 5. The concluding remarks are given in Chapter
6.
4CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Query Authentication
There are three parties involved in data outsourcing, data owner, cloud server, and data
users. The data owner has a database and asks the cloud server to manage it. Users send their
queries to the server for the data of their interest. The server is considered a third-party and
therefore users want a proof that the query results they receive are correct. A query result is
correct if it is sound (i.e., every data item included is from the original database) and complete
(i.e., all data items in the original database that satisfy the query condition are included) [9; 21].
Simple solutions such as signing each data item with a digital signature [15] can prove the
soundness, but not the completeness. The work by Devanbu et al. [9; 10] was among the first
to study this problem. The proposed technique supports the authentication of range query
over a list of data items. The data owner first sorts the data items and computes a one-way
hash value for each data item. A Merkle Hash tree (MH-tree) [18] is then built on top of these
hash values. Figure 2.1 shows 4 data items, r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r3 ≤ r4, and a corresponding MH-tree,
where H(·) denotes the hash function and “|” the concatenation of two nodes. The root node is
signed with the data owner’s private key and made known to all users. In response to a query,
the server returns the result and a Verification Object (VO), which contains a set of data items
for the user to reconstruct the root digest. For example, if the query result is {r3}, then the
corresponding VO includes N1, r2, and r4, and the signed root digest. The user reconstructs
the root digest with these data and compares it with the root digest published by the data
owner. If the two digests match, the user can be assured that r2, r3, and r4 are not tempered
and their order is continuous in the original list.
5))|(()(
4,32,1
NNHSigrootSig 
1
r
3
r
2
r
4
r
)(
11
rHN  )(
22
rHN  )(
33
rHN  )(
44
rHN 
)|(
212,1
NNHN  )|(
434,3
NNHN 
Figure 2.1: Merkle-Hash tree
In [21], Pang et al. proposed an alternative solution. Their idea is to sort the data items
and then create a signature for each data item. Specifically, the signature for a record ri is
computed based on the digest of itself and the digests of its two immediate left and right
neighbors. These signatures together form a signature chain, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. A
query result R = {ri ≤ ri+1 ≤ ... ≤ rj} is accompanied with an VO that contains the signatures
of each data item in R, plus the signatures of ri−1 and rj+1, which are ri’s immediate predecessor
and rj ’s immediate successor, respectively. The chain formed by these signatures serves as the
proof that for any two consecutive data items rk and rk+1 in R, no data item rx exists in
the original database such that rk < rx < rk+1. The completeness is verified by checking the
signatures of boundary records ri−1 and rj+1.
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Figure 2.2: Signature chain
These two Authentication Data Structures (ADS) have their own advantages and disadvan-
tages. With the MH-tree, only the root node needs to be signed, so the computation cost is low.
However, V O(q) needs to contain a set of tree nodes for one to reconstruct the root digest. So
6the size of V O(q) can be large, resulting in higher communication cost. Moreover, it is difficult
to handle dynamic data. When a data item is changed, a significant part of the tree may
need to be rebuilt. On the other hand, using signature chain incurs more computation cost, to
both the data owner and query issuers, but has a smaller V O(q) and thus less communication
overhead. It is also more flexible to update data. When a data item is changed, only a few
signatures need to be updated accordingly. Moreover, a user can perform boundary checking
without having to know the two records that are immediate left and right to the sorted data
in R(q). This feature is useful in access control, since users may not be allowed to have access
to all data items in the list.
The two ADS have since inspired a large body of research on query authentication. The
work [7] considers multi-dimensional queries. The proposed technique maps the whole region
into a multi-dimension data structure (KD-tree or R-tree). The partitions and the points
in each partition space are ordered and then chained with their signatures. To process a
query, the server returns all points inside the partitions that overlap with the query window
and their corresponding signature chains. The work [32; 33] combines R*-tree and MH-tree
to deal with spatial data. Other more complex queries such as KNN, skyline and function
queries were studied in [8; 34; 30; 31]. The work [16; 22; 28; 27] considers the problem of data
dynamics, where the outsourced data may keep changing. Authenticating aggregate queries
such as sum and average was studied in [3]. While most solutions are software-based, where
the authentication relies solely on the ADS created by the data owner, the work [4] explored
tamper-proof, trusted hardware for authentication. The proposed solution can support a variety
of database operations, but require hardware supports.
Regardless their differences, existing techniques support only query authentication, but not
correction. Moreover, they rely on complex cryptographic techniques and thus incur high costs
in storage, communication and computation.
2.2 Parity Coding
Parity coding has played a central role in the theoretical computer science [25]. The basic
idea is to add some extra data to a message, which receivers can use to check consistency of
7the message when received, and to recover data determined to be corrupted. Our research is
inspired by error correction codes. These schemes generate parity data and add to a message
such that it can be recovered by a receiver even when a number of errors (up to the capability of
the code being used) were introduced. Techniques such as Hamming code [14] work on bit-level
error correction. When a bit is known to be wrong, then the correct one must be its opposite.
Our work is mostly related to the family of block codes (e.g., [24], [19]) that can correct a data
(e.g., a 32-bit integer) whose value is in a large field. Block codes are similar in encoding a
stream of raw data block by block, but different in the way of generating parity data. We will
use the well-known Reed-Solomon codes [24] to explain how block codes work in general.
Reed-Solomon coding takes the first k raw data in the stream and then generates p parity
data, where k and p are two pre-fixed values. The k raw data and p parity data together form
the first codeword. It then takes the next k raw data from the stream and generates p parity
data accordingly to form the second codeword, and so on so forth until all raw data in the
stream are encoded. Let XY be a codeword, where X = (x1, x2, ..., xk) is a sequence of k raw
data and Y = (yk+1, yk+2, ..., yk+p) a sequence of p parity data generated for X. Each parity
data yk+j (1 ≤ j ≤ p) is generated with a univariate polynomial function yk+j =
∑k
i=1 xia
i−1
j ,
where aj is a unique coefficient used to generate the ith parity data in each codeword. The way
of generating parity data creates an equation system, where x1, x2, ..., and xk are variables:

y1 = x1
y2 = x2
...
yk = xk
yk+1 = x1 + a1 × x2 + a21 × x3 + ... + an−11 × xk
yk+2 = x1 + a2 × x2 + a22 × x3 + ... + an−12 × xk
...
yk+p = x1 + ap × x2 + a2p × x3 + ... + an−1k × xk
(2.1)
8The above equations form an overdetermined and independent system1 and thus can be
used for error detection and correction. Let (y1, y2, ..., yk+p) be a codeword a user receives.
The user builds the above equations and re-computes the parity data (yk+1, yk+2, ..., yk+p),
with the received (y1, y2, ..., yk). If any computed yk+i does not match the received yk+i
(1 ≤ i ≤ p), then at least one number in the codeword must be wrong. To correct the error(s),
the user computes the most popular copy of X = (x1, x2, ..., xk). Among the k + p equations,
any subset of k equations can be solved to compute a copy of X. Different subsets may result
in different copies of X, but as long as the number of errors in the block is not greater than bp2c,
the most popular copy must be the correct one. The simplest way to find the most popular
copy is to enumerate all subsets of k equations and compute a copy of X for each subset. This
brute-force approach is costly as totally there are
(
k
k+p
)
subsets. Many efficient algorithms
have been developed, such as Peterson decoders [12; 13], Berlekamp–Massey [5; 17], extended
Euclidean algorithm [26]. Some of them (e.g., Syndrome decoding [23], maximum-likelihood
decoding [6], minimum distance decoding [11] ) can be used for block codes in general.
Existing parity coding techniques were designed mainly for purposes such as reliable data
transmission over unreliable communication channels and reliable data storage on unreliable
medias. They cannot be applied directly for query authentication and correction, which we
will discuss shortly.
1A system is overdetermined and independent if no equation in any set of k equations can be derived al-
gebraically from the other k − 1 equations in the set. A set of k equations is independent if the rank of their
coefficients matrix is k [20].
9CHAPTER 3. PARITY-BASED DATA OUTSOURCING
Our research has developed a novel Parity-based Data Outsourcing (PDO) model [29] which
enables query authentication and correction without using cryptographic techniques. We use
Figure 3.1 illustrates our idea. To outsource a database D, a data owner first selects a set of
k+p servers {S1, S2, ..., Sk+p}, each from a different cloud service provider, and decides a value
of e, the maximum number of malicious servers that the system needs to tolerate. A server is
said to be malicious if it does not return correct data back in response to a query (for whatever
reasons, e.g., out of service, compromised by hackers, or network problems). We will assume
the worst case, malicious servers may collude to forge data. The n servers are divided into two
groups. The first k servers are used as data servers and the remaining p = n − k servers as
parity servers, where p has to do with e. The data owner then partitions D into k subsets,
{D1, D2, ..., Dk}, and generates p sets of parity data, {P1, P2, ..., Pp}. Di is uploaded to data
server Si (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and Pj to parity server Sk+j (1 ≤ j ≤ p).
D
Server information and
parity coding parameters
Query
Sub-result
Data Owner Data User
Parity ServersData Servers
Sk+1
... ...
Sk+pSkS2S1
D1 D2 Dk Pk+1 Pk+p
Figure 3.1: System Architecture
To retrieve the data of interest, a user sends a query to all servers. If all servers function
properly, the user can simply filter out the query result R from the data returned by the k data
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servers. However, some servers, up to e, may be malicious, returning no data or wrong data.
So the challenge is how to enable the user to compute the correct R as long as a minimum of
n− e servers return correct data back. Our research is to address this challenge. To make this
thesis self-contained, we first describe our solution for 1-dimensional data, which we published
in [29], and then discuss how to extend it for multidimensional data.
3.1 One-dimensional Data
At the core of our solution is a novel parity coding technique, which we refer to as Query-
oriented Parity Coding (QPC). Let XY be a codeword, where X = (x1, x2, · · · , xk) is a sequence
of k raw data and Y = (yk+1, yk+2, ..., yk+p) a sequence of p parity data generated for X. QPC
generates each parity data with a unique coefficient vector that consists of k numbers. Let
vk+i = [a[i,1], a[i,2], ..., a[i,k]] be the coefficient vector for yk+i (1 ≤ i ≤ p), we have yk+i =
a[i,1]x1 + a[i,2]x2 + ...+ a[i,k]xk. We create the following equation system, where x1, x2, ..., and
xk are variables:

y1 = x1
y2 = x2
...
yk = xk
yk+1 = a[1,1] × x1 + a[1,2] × x2 + ... + a[1,k] × xk
yk+2 = a[2,1] × x1 + a[2,2] × x2 + ... + a[2,k] × xk
...
yk+p = a[p,1] × x1 + a[p,2] × x2 + ... + a[p,k] × xk
(3.1)
Like Reed-Solomon codes, we can make the above equations form an overdetermined and
independent system with appropriate coefficient vectors. However, QPC generates a parity
data with a k-variate 1-degree polynomial, yk+i = a[i,1]x1 + a[i,2]x2 + ... + a[i,k]xk (1 ≤ i ≤ p).
If we select the coefficient vector [a[i,1], a[i,2], ..., a[i,k]] such that every coefficient in the vector
is in between 0 and 1 and
∑k
j=1 a[i,j] = 1, we can guarantee that the generated parity data
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is always not less than the smallest number in X and not greater than the largest number in
X. In other words, if all numbers in X are in between a query range (l, u), then the generated
parity data must also be in the range. As such, if we store each of the k + p data in XY on a
different server, a user who issues a range query q(l, u) to all servers can expect to receive XY
together; even if some servers (up to bp2c) are malicious, the user can still recover the original
XY , thus achieving the purpose of authentication and correction.
We now discuss how to apply QPC in PDO for range query over D that is a set of N
numbers. Recall in PDO, a data owner first selects a set of n servers {S1, S2, ..., Sn}. To
tolerate at most e malicious servers at any one time, the first k = n− 2e servers will be used as
data servers and the remaining p = 2e servers as parity servers. Each parity server Sk+i is also
associated with a coefficient vector [a[i,1], a[i,2], ..., a[i,k]] (1 ≤ i ≤ p) that meets the requirements
of QPC.
Data Preparation. The data owner first sorts the numbers in D in ascending order. If
N mod k 6= 0 , it appends a number of special token MAX (i.e., the largest number) to the sort-
ed list to make its size divisible by k. D is then organized into sequences, each having k numbers.
The first k numbers form the first sequence, the second k numbers form the second sequence,
..., and finally, the last k numbers form the last sequence. The data owner then applies QPC
to encode each sequence (x1, x2, · · · , xk) into a codeword (x1, x2, · · · , xk, yk+1, yk+2, · · · , yk+p),
where yk+j =
∑k
j=1 a[i,j]xj . After encoding all sequences into codewords, the data owner creates
k+p empty lists D1, D2, ..., Dk, P1, P2, ..., and Pp, and stores the codewords in the lists one by
one, starting from the first codeword. For each codeword (x1, x2, · · · , xk, yk+1, yk+2, · · · , yk+p),
store xi in Di (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and yk+j in Pj (1 ≤ j ≤ p). After storing all codewords, the data
owner inserts special token MIN (i.e., the smallest number) to the head and appends MAX to
the end to each of the k + p lists. A list may end with at most 2 MAX tokens (which happens
when N mod k 6= 0 ). Finally, the data owner uploads Di to data server Si (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and
Pj to parity server Sk+j (1 ≤ j ≤ p).
The above procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.2, where sorted D = (1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 2.3, 2.9,
2.9, 3.6, 4.0, 4.2, 4.5, 4.8, 5.1, 5.7, 8.0). Five servers are used and one allowed to be malicious.
So the first three servers are used as data servers and the remaining two as parity servers. The
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coefficient vectors for the two parity servers are [0.1, 0.2, 0.7] and [0.4, 0.2, 0.4], respectively.
The figure shows D is encoded into five codewords, each having two parity data, and the data
list stored on each server. Note that the data lists stored on the servers remain sorted.
D (sorted): 1.2, 1.5, 2.0, 2.3, 2.9, 2.9, 3.6, 4.0, 4.2, 4.5, 4.8, 5.1, 5.5, 5.7, 8.0
1.  Data owner partitions D into sequences, and
     encodes each sequence into a codeword
codeword 1 1.2,     1.5,     2.0
raw data
x1,      x2,       x3
parity data
y4,       y5
1.82,     1.58
2.3,     2.9,     2.9, 2.84,     2.66
3.6,     4.0,     4.2, 4.24,     4.00
4.5,     4.8,     5.1, 4.98,     4.80
5.5,     5.7,     8.0, 7.29,     6.54
1.2,     1.5,      2.0 1.82,     1.58
2.3,     2.9,      2.9, 2.84,     2.66
3.6,     4.0,      4.2, 4.24,     4.00
4.5,     4.8,      5.1, 4.98,     4.80
5.5,     5.7,      8.0, 7.29,     6.54
 MIN    MIN     MIN MIN     MIN
  MAX    MAX   MAX MAX     MAX
2. Data owner creates data 
    lists and uploads to servers
S1
D1
S2
D2
S3
D3
S4
P1
S5
P2
Y4 = 0.1 * x1 + 0.2 * x2 + 0.7 * x3
Y5 = 0.4 * x1 + 0.2 * x2 + 0.4 * x3
            1.5,      2.0 1.82,     1.58
2.3,     2.9,      2.9, 2.84,     2.66
3.6,     4.0,      4.2, 4.24,     4.00
4.5,     4.8,      5.1, 4.98,     4.80
5.5
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
3. Data users retrieve and organize 
    data into an authentication matrix
Case 1: all data in this 
codeword satisfy q(2.5, 4.6)
Case 2: not all data in this 
codeword satisfy q(2.5, 4.6)
codeword 2
codeword 3
codeword 4
codeword 5
authentication matrix
Figure 3.2: Data Preparation, Retrieval, and Authentication and Correction
Data Retrieval. To retrieve the data in between l and u, a user connects to all k + p
servers and ask each of them to return 1) the sublist of the data in between l and u, 2) the
sublist’s immediate left neighbor l′ and right neighbor u′, and 3) the position of l′ in the list.
Note all these requests can be done with standard SQL, without any special software to install
and run on the server side.
Authentication and Correction. The user organizes the received data lists into an
authentication matrix. The matrix has n columns. The list from server Si is placed in column
i, starting from either the first row or the second row, depending on the position of l′. Figure 3.2
shows the matrix created for the data lists returned for q(2.5, 4.6). If all servers return correct
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data back, the matrix shall have these features:
• All columns are occupied. The data in each column must be in the ascending order. The
first data must be smaller than l (except when l = MIN), and the last data must be
larger than u (except when u = MAX).
• Every row, except the first and last rows, are fully occupied, i.e., having n = k + p data.
For each fully occupied row, its first k data (raw data) must match the last p data (parity
data), which can be re-calculated with their corresponding coefficient vectors.
If the matrix does not have these features, something is wrong. The user can detect the
servers that are malicious and still compute the correct result. The ways of encoding D into
codewords and retrieving data for a query q(l, u) guarantee that, for any data in D that is in
between l and u, the user will receive at least n− e correct data in the codeword that contains
the data and thus can recover the data if it is missing or wrong. Let X = (x1, x2, · · · , xk) be
the sequence that contains a data in D that is in between l and u. There are two scenarios:
• Case 1: All data in X are in between l and u. In this case, all corresponding parity data
(yk+1, yk+2, · · · , yk+p) must be also in the range. This is guaranteed by QPC. Since all
servers are asked to return the data in between l and u and at least n − e of them are
trustworthy, the user will receive at least n− e correct numbers in the codeword XY .
• Case 2: Some data, but not all, in X are in the range of l and u. In this case, the user
will still receive at least n − e correct numbers in the corresponding codeword, because
all servers are asked to return two additional data, l’s immediate left neighbor and u’s
immediate right neighbor.
The above two scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3.2. Note that the first row and the last
row in an authentication matrix may not be fully occupied. This is fine since they won’t contain
any number in between l and u.
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3.2 Multi-dimensional Data
We now consider how to extend our original solution for multidimensional data. To simplify
our presentation, we will assume two-dimensional data. It will be easy to see that our technique
can be applied for higher dimension spaces. The overall process of outsourcing and querying is
similar: The data owner partitions the raw data and calculates the parity data, then distributes
the raw data and parity data to n servers; Users queries all servers simultaneously for the data
of their interest and authenticate, and correct if necessary, the query results returned from each
server. Handling multi-dimensional data, however, is more challenging, because it cannot be
sorted like 1-dimensional data.
Figure 3.3 shows 21 data items indicated by an assigned id number. The dataset is sorted
by the horizontal coordinate, and the order is marked by the polylines. The table in the right
side is the data distribution over 3 data servers, and each row is related with a codeword (the
parity servers are not shown). Given the window query (marked as red), the correct query
result is supposed to be r = {id9, id10, id16, id17}. According to the 1-dimensional PDO model,
each server should return two extra items, the immediate left and right neighbor of the sub-
result. For example, the sub-result for the server S1 is the list {d7, d10, d16, d19}, in which d10
and d16 are in the window query while d7 and d19 are the two extras. Similarly, server S2
returns {d14, d17, d20}, and server S3 returns {d6, d9, d12}. But apparently the returned objects
are not sufficient for the data user to reconstruct complete codewords.
Figure 3.3: Index Example
To solve the problem, we propose indexing data with Grid File. The data owner partitions
the dataset into cells by horizontal and vertical lines. The grid cell is defined by these partition
15
lines, and each cell contains several data items or none. A very important feature about the
structure of the Grid File is that the coordinate value of the partition lines in each dimension are
independent, and can be treated as an one-dimensional dataset. For example, in Figure 3.4, the
horizontal lines can be expressed as an one-dimensional dataset sh = {0, 5, 10, 15} and vertical
lines sv = {0, 5, 10, 15}. The basic idea is that the data items within a grid cell can be sorted by
a certain coordinate, then our 1-dimensional technique can be applied to compute parity data,
which are also within the grid cell. For a user’s query, each cloud server returns all overlapped
grid cells back. That is, if a grid cell overlaps with the window query, then all data items in it
are returned. We explain as follow.
For each dimension of the Grid File, the data owner applies the 1-dimensional PDO tech-
nique to outsource the partition lines. If the number of data items in a cell is not a multiple of
the number of data servers, we add some dummy data items in the cell. This is to ensure that
we can generate complete codewords for the cell. We will discuss how to compute the parity
data shortly. After the codewords are created in a cell, they are distributed among the multiple
servers. The same process is applied for all cells.
Taking a two-dimensional dataset for example, the equation system can be expressed in
equation 3.2. Let X = {d1, d2, ..., dk} be a group of raw data. For each data item di, we
use (di.val1, di.val2) to denote di’s values in the first dimension and the second dimension,
respectively. Let Y = {yk+1, yk+2, ...yk+p} denote the parity set generated for X. Let V =
{vk+1, vk+2, ..., vk+p} be the chosen coefficient vectors for Y , and vk+i = {a[i,1], a[i,2], ..., a[i,k]}.
Both dimensions share the same set of coefficient vector, so y[k+ i] contains a two-dimensional
value field. The first dimension value yk+i.val1 = d1.val1×a[i,1]+d2.val1×a[i,2]+ ...+dk.val1×
a[i,k], and second dimension value yk+i.val2 = d1.val2 × a[i,1] + d2.val2 × a[i,2] + ... + dk.val2 ×
a[i,k]. We have the equation yk+i(val1, val2) = [d1(val1, val2), d2(val1, val2), ..., dk(val1, val2)]×
(vk+i)
T :
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
y1(val1, val2) = d1(val1, val2)
y2(val1, val2) = d2(val1, val2)
...
yk(val1, val2) = dk(val1, val2)
yk+1(val1, val2) = [d1(val1, val2), d2(val1, val2), ..., dk(val1, val2)]× (vk+1)T
yk+2(val1, val2) = [d1(val1, val2), d2(val1, val2), ..., dk(val1, val2)]× (vk+2)T
...
yk+p(val1, val2) = [d1(val1, val2), d2(val1, val2), ..., dk(val1, val2)]× (vk+p)T
(3.2)
Users retrieve data in two steps. Let q = (< l1, u1 >,< l2, u2 >) be a query, i.e., retrieving
all data items whose values in the given window. The first step is to identify q’s minimum
boundary cells (MBC), i.e., the minimum set of cells which covers the query window. As a
consequence, the user knows that the sets of partition lines in each dimension. For example,
among the coordinate values in the first dimension, assume l
′
1 is the maximum number which
is no bigger than l1, and u
′
1 is the minimum number which is no less than u1, then all numbers
between the range l
′
1 and u
′
1 form the set of partition lines for the first dimension. We denote
the set as s1. Note that s1 can be retrieved by sending a range query to all servers, and verified
with our 1-dimensional technique. In the same way, the set of partition lines for the second
dimension can be retrieved and verified and we denote this set as s2. As such, the MBC for
q is formed by two sets s1 and s2. The authentication and verification of the two sets can be
done with the one-dimensional data outsourcing technique.
The second step is to retrieve the data items in MBC. The boundary of each grid cell in
MBC can be used as the range of a window query. The authentication and verification are
performed separately for each cell. Users sort the data items according to a certain dimension,
and organize them into authentication matrix for authentication and correction.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the above procedure. The space is partitioned by horizontal lines
sh = {0, 5, 10, 15} and vertical lines sv = {0, 5, 10, 15}. The data owner partitions the set sh,
calculates their parity data, and then uploads the dataset to the the corresponding servers.
17
Figure 3.4: Grid File Partition
The process for sh works in the same way. The data items in each cell are sorted by horizontal
coordinate, partitioned for three data servers (the parity servers are not showed). The window
query is the rectangle in the figure. It overlaps with two cells C[5,10];[5,10] and C[10,15];[5,10], where
the index are the partition lines in horizontal and vertical directions. The MBC is defined by
two sets of partition lines s1 = {5, 10, 15} in the horizontal direction and s2 = {5, 10, 15} in the
vertical direction. Set s1 can be obtained by range queries from the authentication structure of
dataset sh, while s2 can be retrieved from sv. From the table on the right side, we can notice
that the C[5,10];[5,10] contains two codewords, while C[10,15];[5,10] contains one codeword. These
codewords can be obtained from the two cells independently. For instance, the boundary of
C[5,10];[5,10] can be used as a window query to retrieve the two codewords in it.
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented PDO for both 1-dimensional data and multi-dimensional data, us-
ing Java language. For purpose of performance study, we have also implement two related
techniques, MH-tree and signature chain. We describe as follows.
4.1 PDO for One-dimensional Data
The outsourcing model mainly contains three parts, building the authentication structure,
authenticating query result, and correcting if needed. The model structure is displayed in
Figure 4.1.
BuildMSP 
- QPC 
+ build()  
QueryProcess 
+ mspQuery() 
QPC 
- coefficient 
- basicMatrix 
+ calculateParity() 
+ authenticate() 
+ correction()  
MspVerfiy 
-QPC 
+ authenticateAndCorrection() 
BasicMatrix 
+ mutiply() 
+ divide()  
Figure 4.1: One Dimensional Parity Coding Class Design
• Class BuildMSP is for the data owner to partition the raw data, and prepare the parity
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data, and distribute the dataset among the corresponding cloud servers. The number of
data servers and parity servers are given in a configuration file, which is shared by all
the classes in the project. The building process is explained in Algorithm 1. In addition,
to prepare the parity data part of a codeword, the function calls the parity calculation
function in Class QPC.
Algorithm 1 Build()
1: AddHead() //adding the special starting token
2: For each codeword, do //create codeword one by one
3: PrepareRawData() //prepare the raw data part
4: PrepareParityData() //prepare the parity data part
5: End For
6: AddEnd() //adding the special ending token
• Class QueryProcess is used by cloud servers to receive queries from users. After pro-
cessing queries, they return the results to users. Each server processes the queries inde-
pendently, and returns a sub-result for a query.
• Class MspVerify is used by users to verify the received query results. At first, a user
authenticates the query result. If the sub-results from cloud servers do not match with
each other, it starts the correction process. The algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. In
line 1, all the sub-results for a query is organized in the authentication matrix. The
authentication of each codeword is checked in line 3, and the correction is executed in
line 5.
Algorithm 2 authentionOrCorrect(subResults, query)
1: Organize each sub-result in a matrix
2: For each codeword, do
3: If it is authenticated, then adding to result
4: Else recover the real sub-result.
5: End For
• Class QPC is responsible for the implementation of calculating parity data, authenticat-
ing query result, and correcting if needed. The functions are explained as follows:
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– calculateParity() mainly receives the raw data, and multiplies the coefficient vector.
It returns the computed parity data.
– authenticate() receives the organized codeword, and recalculates the equation sys-
tem to check whether the values of the elements match with each other. It returns
a boolean data type.
– correction() recovers the real result if there exists inconsistence in authentication.
The function is invoked by the methods in class MspVerify, and it contains two
important algorithms. One is to find out all the combinations of k of k+p equations,
since every k equations decide a copy of X in equation system. The collection of
all the subsets is recursive process, which display in Algorithm 3. The final result is
returned in subsetsList. Another algorithm is to count the most popular subset in
Algorithm 4. It uses a HashMap to count the copy of solutions and the corresponding
frequency, then sorts the elements in the HashMap to get the most popular with the
highest frequency.
Algorithm 3 subset(subsetsList, currentList, index, equations[])
1: If currentList.size = k, then add currentList to subsetList
2: While index < k + p, do
3: Add equations[index + 1] to currentList
4: subset(subsetList, currentList, index + 1, equations[])
5: Remove equations[index + 1] from currentList
6: index + +
7: End While
Algorithm 4 mostPopularSolution(subsetsList)
1: create a HashMap solutionMap, which stores the copy of solution and the frequency
2: For each subset in subsetsList, do
3: Add to solutionMap, and increase the frequency by one
4: End For
5: Use HeapSort to order the copies of solutions by frequency
6: Return the most popular one
• Class BasicMatrix contains the basic matrix calculation, such as multiplication and
division operations. These methods are called by the class QPC.
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4.2 PDO for Multi-dimensional Data
Recall that we use Grid File to index the multi-dimensional dataset. To construct the Grid
File index, we need to specify three parameters. The first one is the boundary of the Grid File,
which can cover all the dataset. The second one is the dimension of the dataset, apparently
the dimension of the structure is the same as the dataset. The third one is the capacity of the
grid cell. After the three parameters are fixed, the data items are added into the Grid one by
one. At the beginning, the whole Grid is treated as a big cell. When the number of data items
added reaches to the capacity of the big cell, the cell is cut into two new cells. The data items
are reassigned into the corresponding new cells. In this way, the data items from the original
dataset keep inserting into the grid cells, and a cell is divided by a cutting plane (a cutting line
in two-dimensional case) once its capacity is full.
When the Grid File structure is built, the parity coding technique is applied on for data
items among these cells. Here, each cell is treated as an independent unit, and each dimension
of the data items is independent too. First, if the number of items in a cell is not divisible
by the number of data servers k, then dummy items are added. Second, the data items are
sorted by the first dimension value. Then every k data items can be used to calculate a group
of parity data. Accordingly, a codeword can be created by combining the k raw data and the
related parity data. Finally, all codewords are uploaded into the cloud servers.
The class designed for the parity-based multi-dimensional data outsourcing is displayed in
Figure 4.2. It includes the building of the Grid File, query processing and the performance
measurement of authentication time and correction time.
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Main
- RangeQuery
+ gridFileBuildTest()
+ processQuery()
+ verifyTest()
+ correctionTest() 
GridAgentTest
- Result
+ gridFileBuildStart()
+ queryResult()
+ authentication()
+ correctionResult()
ParityGenerator
- QPC
- numDataServer
- numParityServer
- dimension
+ generatorParityCode()
+ addDummy()
+ codewsGenerator()
+ calculateParityData()
+ 
calculateParityOneDim()
CpuUsage
- startTime
- endTime
+ startMonitor()
+ endMonitor()
+ costTime()
QuerySolver
- RangeQuery
+ calculateResult()
+ calculateSubResult ()
+ withinCell()
+ calculateQueryCells()
+ calcAxis()
Verification
- QPC
- queryRes
+ authenticate()
+ correction()
GridBuilder
+ buildGrid()
+ setBoundary()
+ insertPoints()
CellManager
+ insertDataToCell ()
+ updateAxis ()
+ furtherCheck()
+ isOverflow()
+ cutCell()
+ generateNewCells()
+ rearranPointsInCell()
+ isDataInCell()
+ cutInTwoCells()
+ candidateCell()
+ prepareNextCut()
Cell
- leftCorner
- rightCorner
- points
+ getLeftCorner ()
+ setLeftCorner()
+ getRightCorner()
+ setRightCorner()
Axis
- treesetList
+ getCellBoundaries()
+ getCell4Point()
+ addCordinates()
+ getLowBound()
+ getUpBound()
Figure 4.2: Multi-dimensional Data Outsourcing Class Design
The definition of each class and the related algorithms are explained as follows:
• Class Main is the entry point for testing the computation time, authentication time and
correction time.
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• Class GridAgentTest is the agent which receives the query and processes the tasks from
the class Main. The primary attributes and functions are as follows:
– Result: stores the query result after query processing.
– gridFileBuildTest() builds the authentication structure. It contains two steps, the
first one is creating the Grid File index, another is generating the parity data among
the grid cells.
– processQuery() receives the window queries, and returns the query results.
– authenticate() checks the query result whether it is sound and completeness.
– correctionResult() corrects the query result.
• Class GridBuilder is responsible for creating the Grid File index.
– buildGrid() implements of building the Grid File structure.
– setBoundary() sets the boundary of the Grid File.
– insertPoints() inserts the raw data items to the Grid File.
• Class ParityGenerator calculates the parity data and generates the codewords after
the establishment of the Grid File index. The algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
– QPC: implements the parity data calculation.
– numDataServer: the number of data servers.
– numParityServer: the number of parity servers.
– dimension: the dimension of the dataset.
– generatorParityCode() traverses through all the cells, and sorts the data items in
each cell to prepare for the generation of the codewords.
– addDummy() adds dummy items to a cell if necessary.
– codewsGenerator() generates the codewords within a cell. The specific calculation
is in calculateParityData().
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– calculateParityData() prepares the parity data for a group of raw data items. For
each dimension, it invokes the function calculateParityOneDim().
– calculateParityOneDim() calculates the parity data for a certain dimension of the
data items.
Algorithm 5 ParityGenerator(QPC, numDataServer, numParityServer)
1: For each cell in Grid File, do
2: If the number of items in cell is not divisible by numDataServer, then addDummy()
3: Sort all the items in cell by the first dimension
4: For each numDataServer items, do
5: For each dimension of these items, do
6: Calculate parity data
7: End For
8: Combine the raw data and parity data into a codeword
9: End For
10: End For
• Class CellManager is the manager of building the Grid File structure, including the
updating of the Grid File structure, updating of the coordinate axis. The functions in
details are as follows:
– insertDataToCell() inserts a data item into the Grid. The inserting process might
cause the overflow of a grid cell, consequently it leads to the cutting requirement of
a series of cells.
– updateAxis()updates the set of axis. When a cell is cut, a new coordinate value
would appear, and it should be added into class Axis.
– furtherCheck() double-checks whether the new divided cell overflowed or not, after
a cell is cut, .
– isOverflow() checks whether a cell overflow, basically it checks whether the number
of data items exceeds the threshold of the cell capacity.
– cutCell() cuts a series of affected cells which overlap with the cutting plane.
– generateNewCells() updates the set of cells in CellManager, since there are new cells
generated.
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– rearranPointsInCell() rearranges the data items in the new cells after the original
cell is cut.
– isDataInCell() checks whether a data item is in a cell.
– cutInTwoCells() implements the procedure of partitioning a cell into two.
– candidateCell() finds out all the cells affected by the cutting plane.
– prepareNextCut(): indicates the cutting rules.
• Class Cell is used for creating the object of the grid cell. It has three attributes:
– leftCorner: indicates the coordinate of the left corner.
– rightCorner: indicates the coordinate of the right corner.
– points: contains all the data items in the current cell.
• Class Axis keeps all the coordinate values in all dimensions, and provides the functions
related with coordinate value.
– getCellBoundaries() identifies the MBC for the query when a window query is given.
– getCell4Point() inputs a data item, and outputs the cell which can cover it.
– addCordinates() updates the coordinates in Axis.
– getLowBound() returns the lower boundary of a value.
– getUpBound() returns the upper boundary of a value.
• Class QuerySolver communicates with the third-party to fetch the query result.
– RangeQuery: stores the query.
– calculateResult() collects all the sub-results from all the cloud servers.
– calculateSubResult() gets the query result from a certain server.
– withinCell() identifies the cell for a record received from a server, since it can contains
extra information, such as dummy mark.
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– calculateQueryCells(): after the MBC is obtained, assembles all the related cells.
The implementation is a recursive procedure, which is given in Algorithm 6.
– calcAxis(): returns all the overlapping coordinate values.
Algorithm 6 calculateQueryCells(cellsResult, current, axises, level)
1: If level == axises.size, then add current to cellsResult.
2: For each value in level-th element in axises, do
3: Add value in current
4: calculateQueryCells(cellsResult, current, axises, level + 1)
5: Delete value from current
6: End For
• Class Verification gives the functions of authentication and correction of query results.
– QPC: calls the verification operations in it.
– queryRes: the returned result from cloud servers.
– authenticate() checks whether the calculation based on the codeword matches with
the received values. The process of authenticating a query result is given in Algo-
rithm 7
– correction() corrects the query result if there are errors in it.
Algorithm 7 authenticate(QPC, queryRes, axises, level)
1: For each subResults in queryRes, do
2: Organize the subResult into columns
3: For each codeword, do
4: QPC.authenticate(codeword) //check authentication
5: End For
6: End For
4.3 Implementation of Related Work
We compare the parity-based data outsourcing in one-dimensional dataset with the two
existing techniques, MH-tree and Signature Chain. The performance comparison includes the
time cost in computation and authentication. The computation cost refers to the time it
requires to build the authentication structure. That is, the computation cost is in the data
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owner side. The authentication cost is the time which the user uses to verify the query result.
We start from the MH-tree scheme, the constructing of the MH-tree can be implemented layer
by layer. It is a binary tree and each ancestor node is built upon its two child nodes. For
simplicity, we design a full binary tree. In order to facilitate the query processing through the
tree, each internal node contains the range of attribute it covers. Therefore, the query process
and the constructing of the VO can be done at the same time. In the Signature Chain, two
dummy nodes should be added at the two chain ending. The query result is continue partial
chain from the original Signature Chain. In order to prove that there are no data missing at the
boundary of the query result, the VO needs to include two extra nodes beside the real result.
In the PDO scheme, there are also some places which need to be noticed in implementation.
The original dataset should be sorted in ascending order before applying the parity coding
technique. A certain number of dummy items are added if the size of original dataset is not
divisible by the number of data servers.
The class design is displayed in Figure 4.3. The process starts from building structure, then
query processing, verification at last. Another feature is that in the class VerifyScheme, the
two existing schemes support only authentication, but not correction.
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Scheme
- queries
+ buildTest()
+ verifyTest() 
BuildScheme
+ merkleModel()
+ chainModel()
+ mspModel()
QueryTest
- query
- merkleResult
- chainResult
- mspResult
+ buildMerkleTree()
+ queryMerkle()
+ verifyMerkle()
+ buildSignatureChain()
+ queryChain()
+ verifyChain()
+ buildMsp()
+ queryMsp()
+ verifyMsp()
MerkleVerify
+ merkleResVerify()
QueryProcess
+ merkleQuery()
+ chainQuery()
+ mspQuery()
CpuUsage
- startTime
- endTime
+ startMonitor()
+ endMonitor()
+ costTime()
VerifyScheme
+ merkleResultVerify()
+ chainResultVerify()
+ mspResultVerify()
ChainVerify
+ chainResVerify()
MspVerify
+ authenticationAndCorrection()
BuildMerkle
+ build()
+ calculateTreeHash()
BuildSignatureChain
+ build()
BuildMsp
-QPC
+ build()
MerkleResult
+ calculateQueryResult()
ChainResult
+ calculateQueryResult()
MspResult
+ calculateQueryResult()
Figure 4.3: Performance Comparison Class Design
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The classes and the related algorithms are explained as follows:
• Class Scheme is the access entry to test the time used for building an authentication
structure, and verifying a query cost. It receives queries from the users.
• Class CpuUsage is used by the class Scheme to record the starting time, ending time
and time cost of an action.
• Class QueryTest provides the whole access points for building structure, query process-
ing, verification.
• Class BuildScheme is called by the class QueryTest. And it contains all the three
building model: merkleModel, chainModel, mspModel.
• Class BuildMerkle provides the implementation of merkleModel. The tree is built
from the bottom to the root. For each leaf node, it stores the real value and the hash
value of the node. For each internal node, it stores the range, which the child nodes
cover, and also the hash value. Only the the root of the tree is digitally signed. The
building procedure is given in Algorithm 8. To calculate the hash value of each node, the
Algorithm 9 involves in a tree postorder traverse.
Algorithm 8 buildMerkle(records)
1: For each level from the bottom to up, do
2: For each node, do
3: Calculate the range it covers, and store in the node
4: End For
5: End For
6: Traverse the tree, and calculate the hash value of each node
7: Sign the root
Algorithm 9 calculateTreeHash(root)
1: If root == NULL, then return
2: calculateTreeHash(root.left)
3: calculateTreeHash(root.right)
4: Calculate the Hash value of the root
• Class BuildSignatureChain provides the implementation of chainModel. The process
is given in Algorithm 10. First, generate two dummy nodes at the two ending, with a
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special token value. Then, for each node, compute the hash value, and sign a signature
over itself and its two neighbors.
Algorithm 10 buildChain(records)
1: addDummy(MIN)
2: addDummy(MAX)
3: For each record, do
4: Calculate the hash value H(record) of the presented node
5: End For
6: For each chain node, do
7: Sign the node, Sig(H(node)) = Sig(H(H(node.left)|H(record)|H(node.right)))
8: End For
• Class BuildMsp is explained in previous section.
• Class QueryProcess processes the queries representing cloud servers, and returns the
query result to the class QueryTest.
• Class VerifyScheme receives the query result from QueryTest, and passes to the three
different verification module, merkleResultV erify, chainResultV erify, mspResultV erify.
• Class MerkleVerify provides the implementation of the module merkleResultV erify.
The process is similar to the process of building the authentication structure, starting
from the bottom, reconstructing the hash value of the root, and comparing with the
signed one.
• Class ChainVerify provides the implementation of chainResultV erify, which is de-
scribed in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11 chainResVerify(Query, Result, V O(query))
1: For each sig(node) in V O, do
2: If Sig−1(Sig(node)) 6= H(H(node.left)|H(node)|H(node.right)), reject Result.
3: Else if node.value is not in Query range, Reject Result.
4: End For
5: Accept Result.
• Class MspVerify is described in previous section.
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CHAPTER 5. PERFORMANCE STUDY
We compare the performance of PDO, MH-tree, and Signature Chain, through both analysis
and experiments. For all three techniques, the data owner needs to pre-process the original
dataset before delegation to the cloud servers. The cost for the data owner includes that (1)
Storage overhead, defined to be the ratio between the size of the data that needs to be uploaded
to the servers and the size of the original data; (2) Preparation cost, i.e., the time incurred
in building an authentication data structure. To data users, the main overhead includes (1)
Communication cost, which is the size of the data received from the servers; (2) Authentication
cost, which is the time for the users to authenticate the received query result; (3) Correction
cost, which is the time incurred in correcting a wrong query result.
In addition to analysis, we have studied their performance through experiments, where we
are our code on a server with Intel Xeon 4-core CPU 2.67GHz, 16GB RAM.
5.1 Analysis
Storage overhead. Let |D| be the number of records in the database D, k is the number
of data servers, and p = n − k is the number of parity servers, thus e = bp2c is the maximum
number of malicious servers allowed. Let t denote the size of a data record. The length of a
hash value can be varying, e.g. 128 bits, 256 bits, 512 bits, depending on the practical algorithm
used. Let |H| be the length of a hash value. The length of a digital signature is normally longer
than a hash value, it can be 1024 bits or 2014 bits and so on. Let |sign| be the length of a
signature. The storage cost for each of the scheme is as follows:
• Parity Coding : the database D will be encoded into d |D|n−2ee codewords, each consisting k
raw data and p parity data records. Since the parity data has the same size as the raw
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data, the total size of raw data and parity data is (d |D|n−2ee) · n · t.
• MH-tree: each node in the tree (leaf or internal node) stores the range it represented, a
hash value. We assume that the size of the rangee is the same as a data value. Besides,
the root has a signature. Therefore, the total size of authentication structure is 2 · |D| ·
(t + |H|) + |sign|.
• Signature Chain: in this scheme, every chain node requires not only a data value and hash
value, but also a signature based on itself and its two neighbors. Plus, two dummy nodes
are added in the two ending. In consequence, the total size is (|D|+ 2) · (t+ |H|+ |sign|).
Communication cost. Let |q| be the query size, specifically the number of records which
satisfy the query condition. The communication cost for each of the scheme is as follows:
• Parity Coding : besides the records within the query range, each server will send back two
more extra records. Accordingly the data records received from each server is d |q|n−2ee+ 2.
So the total communication cost is (d |q|n−2ee+ 2) · n · t.
• MH-tree: the query result is a contiguous leaf nodes, and V O contains two extra leaf
nodes in the boundary, the auxiliary hash values of the nodes along in the search path,
and the signature of root. Basically the size of the query result is about (|q|+ 2) · t. Since
the height of the tree is log|D|, the size of hash values in V O is around 2 · log|D| · |H|.
Thus, the total is (|q|+ 2) · t + 2 · log|D| · |H|+ |sign|
• Signature Chain: the items sent back includes a consecutive chain nodes which are in the
query range and the two extra nodes at the boundary. So the cost is (|q|+2) · (t+ |sign|).
5.2 Experiments
We compare the preparation cost, authentication cost and correction cost using simulation,
and we will show how these cost are impacted by the size of the dataset, query size, and the
number of servers.
Impact of Dataset Size. Given a dataset, we study the impact of datasize size on preparation
cost. For the existing schemes, we record the time of building a MH-tree and Signature Chain.
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For our approach, we use 5 servers in total, and have two configurations on the maximum
number of malicious servers: e = 1 and e = 2. Accordingly, we identify the two settings as
PDO-5-1 and PDO-5-2. We increase the data size (i.e., the total number of records in the
dataset) from 210 to 217. The results are plotted in Figure 5.1, and it shows that Signature
Chain is the worst performer. This is not surprising, since this scheme needs one-way hash on
every number and builds a signature for every hash value. MH-tree also requires to one-way
hash every node of the binary tree. However, it needs to create only one signature for the tree
root. Our result shows that MH-tree outperforms Signature Chain in 2-3 orders of magnitude
in generating the authentication structure. The two PDO schemes outperform MH-tree in
another 3 orders of magnitude. These results convince that generating parity data, which is
to compute a multivariate linear polynomial function, incurs much less computation time than
computing one-way hash function and digital signatures. Our results also show that tolerating
more malicious servers result in more preparation cost, but not in a significant way.
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Figure 5.1: Impact of Data Size
Impact of Query Size. In this study, we first compare PDO with MH-tree and Signature
Chain in terms of authentication cost. Again, we use 5 servers in PDO but have two configu-
rations of the maximum number of malicious servers, e = 1 and e = 2. In each simulation, we
apply the three techniques in authenticating a query result, the size of which varies from 1000
to 5000. We consider the worst scenario: the query result is correct so each technique needs to
check every number. In reality, the checking stops whenever an error is found. The results are
plotted in Figure 5.2 (a). It shows that Signature Chain incurs most time in authentication.
Again, this scheme needs to recompute all hash values and verify their signatures. MH-tree
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performs better than Signature Chain. It also requires to recompute all hash values but needs
to verify only one signature. Note that their performance gap is not as great as in Figure 5.1.
This is due to the fact that verifying a signature is less computation-intensive than creating
a signature. The two PDO schemes outperform the two existing approaches in 2-3 orders of
magnitude. In PDO, the authentication is done by recomputing the parity data. Again, this
computation cost is much less than computing one-way hash values, not mentioning computing
digital signatures.
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Figure 5.2: Impact of Query Size
In this study, we also look at the cost of correcting a wrong query result. MH-tree and
Signature Chain do not support correction, so we focus on our own technique. In our simulation,
we randomly remove one or two data sets (depending on the settings of the number of malicious
servers) returned from the servers and apply our technique to recover them. We vary the query
size from 1000 to 5000 and plot the results in Figure 5.2 (b). As the query size increases,
the correct cost increases, since more data needs to be recovered. For the same reason, more
malicious servers result in more correction cost, which is showed in the figure.
Impact of Server Number. In PDO, a data owner outsources data to a number of servers.
We are interested in how the number of servers impacts the performance of this scheme. For
this purpose, we generate a data set of 230 numbers and vary the number of servers n from
3 to 10. We simulate two settings of malicious servers, e = 1 and e = 2, which requires n
to be at least 3 and 5, respectively. Figure 5.3 (a) illustrates the preparation costs. It shows
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Figure 5.3: Impact of Server Number
that this cost is insensitive to the number of servers. Both curves are nearly flat. This can
be explained as follows. When e is fixed, increasing n results in a larger k (the number of
data servers) and thus, a smaller redundancy rate 2en−2e . The result is less number of parity
data to be generated. However, each parity data is now generated with k raw data. In other
words, the number of parity data reduces but the cost of generating a parity data increases.
Apparently the two factors offset each other and result in a nearly constant preparation. For
the same reason, we expect the number of servers to have little impact on the authentication
cost and correction. This is confirmed in Figure 5.3 (b) and (c), respectively. Note that when
n is fixed, but e increases, we have more parity data to generate out of a same set of data, thus
the computation time increases, which we can observe in the figures.
5.3 Extension
The analysis and simulation above compare the PDO scheme with the existing techniques.
But when the dataset turns into multi-dimensional, it causes significant difference, due to the
fact that the original dataset cannot be index in the same way as in one dimensional case.
The introduction of Grid File is for solving the sorting problem. To build the authentication
structure, the data owner needs to create the Grid File index first, then generates the parity
coding among the Grid cells. Here, we will show the performance result of our technique in
multi-dimensional case, in terms of preparation cost, authentication cost, correction cost.
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Preparation Cost. The result is displayed in Figure 5.4 (a). To avoid the special case, we use
7 servers in total, and have two configurations in the maximum number of malicious servers:
e = 1 and e = 2. In this simulation, the data size increase from 210 to 217. From the two
sets of output, we can see that there is no very obvious difference in the beginning. But with
continuous accretion of the data size, it proves the conclusion that tolerating more malicious
servers lead to more preparation cost.
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Figure 5.4: Preparation Cost
To study the impact of the dimension on the preparation cost, we set the data size 214, and
the dimension varies from 2 to 7. The result is displayed in Figure 5.4 (b). As the number
of dimension increases, on the one hand, it incurs more computation time in generating the
parity data; On the other hand, building the Grid File index contains randomness in partition
the Grid cells.
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Figure 5.5: Authentication Cost
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Authentication Cost. To retrieve the query result, the users first need to find out the MBC
of the window query, then authenticate the MBC. If MBC is correct, then for each candidate
cell, the users send the boundary of the cell (used as window query) to each server. Considering
that the first step is similar to the process in one dimensional case, we only test the time cost in
the second step, which authenticates the sub-result in each candidate cell. The authentication
result is displayed in Figure 5.5. The query size varies from 213 to 217. Basically, the time cost
increases as the query size increases.
Correction Cost. Similar to the testing in authentication cost, we only consider the second
step. To correct a codeword, the users need to find out the most popular solution. However,
in reality, if a server is marked as malicious, then the returned data is just removed from
the equation system. This implies that the correction procedure does not need any more
for the remaining codewords, once the malicious server is confirmed. Besides, the number of
equations in the equation system reduced accordingly. In this simulation, to test the average
time for correction, we repeat the correction operation on each codeword received. The result
is displayed in Figure 5.6. We use the query size as the correction time from 213 to 217. The
time increases almost in a linear increasing manner.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
We have described a Parity-based Data Outsourcing (PDO) model. In contrast to existing
techniques that use cryptography and store data on a single server, our approach is to pair
the raw data with parity data and store them on a number of servers from different vendors.
We show that this approach allows data users to verify if the query results they receive are
indeed sound and complete, but also correct if any data is wrong. Our model has a few other
desired features. 1) PDO is fault-tolerant. Unless more than e servers are malicious, users
can always have access to their data and receive correct query results. 2) PDO is simple
and practical. Customers simply upload a smaller database to a cloud server and query it
with standard SQL. There is no need for them to develop and/or install any extra software.
3) PDO is cost-effective and load balanced by its nature. The extra storage overhead is the
parity data. In our implementation, each server is allocated with a similar size of data. The
communication cost of receiving a query result has a similar redundant rate. While the original
PDO is designed to support one-dimensional data, we have extended it for multi-dimensional
data. We have implemented our techniques and two existing techniques, namely, MH-tree and
Signature Chain, and studied their performance through both analysis and experiments.
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